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ABSTRACT. Structural models that admit multiple reduced forms, such as game-theoretic
models with multiple equilibria, pose challenges in practice, especially when parameters
are set-identified and the identified set is large. In such cases, researchers often choose
to focus on a particular subset of equilibria for counterfactual analysis, but this choice can
be hard to justify. This paper proposes a refinement criterion for the identified set. Our
criterion chooses a subset such that counterfactual predictions of outcomes are most stable
against local perturbations of the reduced forms (e.g. the equilibrium selection rule). Our
refinement has multiple appealing features, including an intuitive characterization, lower
computational cost, and stable predictions. Focusing on moment inequality models, we
propose bootstrap inference on the refinement and provide generic conditions under which
the inference is uniformly asymptotically valid. We present and discuss results from our
Monte Carlo study and an empirical application based on a model with top-coded data.
KEY WORDS: Counterfactual Analysis, Multiple Equilibria, Equilibrium Selection Rule, Lo-
cally Robust Refinement
JEL CLASSIFICATION: C30, C57
1. Introduction
Economists often use a structural model to analyze the effect of a policy that has never
been implemented, such as potential mergers or changes to legislation. For such analysis,
it is crucial to have a plausible specification of the causal relationship between the policy
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2variable and the outcome variable of interest. However, a plausible specification can come
short of determining the causal relationship uniquely. Prominent examples are found in
game theoretic models, where the presence of multiple equilibria admits multiple reduced
forms. (Tamer (2003) called models with multiple reduced forms incomplete.)
Such models pose challenge for counterfactual analysis, especially when the parame-
ters are set-identified with a large identified set. It is not unusual that predictions from
counterfactual analysis based on different equilibria yield self-contradictory results (Aguir-
regabiria and Nevo (2012), p.115). In this situation, just as in the calibration approach
in macroeconomics, it is not uncommon that the researcher chooses certain values of the
parameters or a specific equilibrium to obtain a meaningful analysis.1 However, such a
choice, if not based on a priori guidance, can be hard to justify.
When one chooses a subset of the identified set for prediction, it is reasonable to focus
on one that produces most “reliable” counterfactual predictions. Predictions that are sensi-
tive to a change of the aspects of the model that the researcher is not sure about cannot be
reliable. Given that the researcher is often least sure about how a reduced form is deter-
mined in the data generating process, we propose using a subset of the identified set which
produces counterfactual predictions that are robust to local perturbations of the reduced
forms (e.g. local perturbations of the equilibrium selection rule in a game setting).2
More specifically, consider a causal relationship between endogenous variable y and
exogenous variables x, ε:
y = gβ,γ(x, ε; η),(1)
where β is the parameter of interest, γ a nuisance parameter, and η is a random variable
with distributionG. Without observing η or knowingG, the model admits multiple reduced
forms. For example, in the case of games with multiple equilibria, G plays the role of the
equilibrium selection rule.
Suppose that the counterfactual setting of interest involves a counterfactual distribution
F˜X for X. Consider the average structural function (ASF) (Blundell and Powell (2004)):
ASFβ,γ,G(x) =
∫ ∫
gβ,γ(x, ε; η)dG(η|x, ε)dFε(ε),
1For example, in an entry model, Jia (2008) focuses on the equilibrium that is most profitable to one of
the firms, and Ackerberg and Gowrisankaran (2006) use an equilibrium selection rule which randomizes
between a Pareto-best equilibrium and a Pareto-worst equilibrium with an unknown probability. Another
example is Roberts and Sweeting (2013) in the context of auctions, who consider the particular equilibrium
with the lowest signal for agents in the model so they enter the auction.
2This echoes in spirit Aguirregabiria and Mira (2010) when they said, “if the structural model will be used
to predict a counterfactual policy, it seems reasonable that the model should be judged in terms of its ability
to predict that particular policy. In this sense, the “best” model depends on the type of counterfactual policy
one wants to predict....” (p.58).
3where Fε denotes the distribution of ε, and G(·|x, ε) the conditional distribution of η given
x and ε. Then our proposal is that we choose γ that minimizes
sup
G′∈B(G;δ)
∣∣∣∣∫ ASFβ,γ,G(x)dF˜X(x)− ∫ ASFβ,γ,G′(x)dF˜X(x)∣∣∣∣ ,(2)
where B(G; δ) denotes a neighborhood of G. We call the resulting set of values (β, γ)
in the identified set the Locally Robust Refinement (LRR). In many set-ups, the LRR is a
substantially smaller set than the identified set, and can produce informative results from
a counterfactual analysis with a much smaller computational cost.3 Furthermore, the LRR
is often very intuitive. For example, the LRR in an entry game picks nuisance parameter
values that minimize the region of multiple equilibria, as we show in Section 3.
The formulation in (2) gives the impression that the LRR involves additional optimiza-
tion over an infinite dimensional space in estimation, adding to computational cost. Using
the linearity of ASFβ,γ,G(x) in G and Hilbert space geometry, this paper gives a simple char-
acterization of the LRR so that focusing on the LRR does not cause extra computational
cost. In fact, due to the additional constraints that come from the LRR, the computational
cost is substantially reduced from a benchmark case without using the LRR. Furthermore,
this paper develops a method of bootstrap inference on the LRR from the identified set
for a moment inequality model, by modifying the procedure of Romano, Shaikh, and Wolf
(2014), and establishes its uniform asymptotic validity. A modification is inevitable due to
the additional constraints that come from the LRR, the subvector inference, and empirical
processes involved in the inference. (See, e.g., Bugni, Canay, and Shi (2017) and Kaido,
Molinari, and Stoye (2017) and references therein for recent developments in subvector
inference.)
There have been attempts to develop a method or criterion to choose a subset of the
identified set in the literature. Song (2014) analyzed the problem of choosing a point
from the identified interval based on the local asymptotic minimax regret criterion. Aryal
and Kim (2013) considered an incomplete English auction model where the seller is am-
biguity averse, and employing the Γ-maximin expected utility framework of Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989), suggested a point decision on the optimal reserve price. Jun and
Pinkse (2017b) considered an incomplete English auction set-up similar to that in Haile
and Tamer (2003) and proposed a point decision on the optimal reserve price using a
maximum entropy method. Jun and Pinkse (2017a) studied a discrete two-player com-
plete information game and established sharp identification of counterfactual predictions
3As shown in the paper, the approach of LRR applies to causally incomplete models other than game-theoretic
models, such as models involving top-coded data.
4of the game. Furthermore, they investigated point decisions on the probability distribu-
tions through a maximum entropy method and what they called a Dirichlet approach, and
compared the two methods. In contrast, our refinement applies to a more general set-up
than auction models or two-player games, and focuses on the stability of predictions from
counterfactual analyses.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section gives a general set-up of a structural
model and presents examples that fit our framework. Section 3 presents the approach
of LRR and provides its characterization that is useful for implementation in practice.
Focusing on generic moment inequality models, Section 4 proposes subvector inference for
LRR and shows its uniform asymptotic validity. Sections 5 and 6 present results from Monte
Carlo simulations and an empirical application. Section 7 concludes. In the Appendix, we
provide mathematical proofs.
2. A Counterfactual Analysis with Multiple Reduced Forms
2.1. Models with Multiple Reduced Forms
Suppose that data {(Y ′i , X ′i)′}ni=1 are drawn from the joint distribution P of (Y ′, X ′)′
which obeys the following reduced form: for y ∈ RdY and W = (X ′, ε′)′,
Y = g(W ; η),(3)
for some function g, and W = (X, ε), where X is observed but ε and η are not. For each
value η, we regard the map g(·; η) as representing a functional-causal relationship between
internal variables Y and external variables W .4 This relationship is fully determined once
the value of η is realized. Typically, ε has a structural meaning such as unobserved costs,
whereas η does not and is used only as an index for a reduced form. For example, in
a game-theoretic model, W = (X, ε) represents observed and unobserved payoff compo-
nents and η an index for an equilibrium. The response of Y to a change in W is ambiguous
unless the value of η is fixed. In this sense, there is a multiplicity of reduced forms in (3).
4Here we follow the proposal by Heckman (2010) (p.56) and use the terms internal variables and external
variables. External variables are specified from outside of the structural equations as inputs, and internal
variables are generated through the system of equations from the inputs. External variables are not nec-
essarily exogenous variables. When X is correlated with ε, the variable X is called endogenous, although
(X, ε) is jointly given externally as inputs, and thus is a vector of external variables. Here a reduced form
refers to a system of equations where all the variables on the left hand side are internal variables and all the
variables on the right hand side are external variables. Leamer (1985) pointed out that the term “exogeneity”
was used in the literature in multiple different senses.
52.2. Counterfactual Analysis
We focus on a counterfactual experiment where the distribution FP of the external vector
W is changed to a counterfactual one F˜P . Such a counterfactual experiment includes cases
where one “shuts off” the effect of a certain covariate, “fixing” of the covariate to a certain
value, or changing the distribution of ε. Suppose that the counterfactual quantity of inter-
est is generically denoted by ρ(g, F˜P ) which depends on (g, F˜P ). This quantity could be,
for example, the prediction of game outcomes or expected payoffs under a counterfactual
scenario. Then the identified set for ρ(g, F˜P ) is given by
{ρ(g, F˜P ) : g ∈ GP},
where GP is the identified set of g in the counterfactual environment. A standard approach
to perform inference is to estimate the set and make inference based on it. This approach
faces multiple challenges in practice. The set of predictions can be of little use in practice,
when the estimated set is too large. Construction of the set itself and statistical inference
can be computationally intensive.
2.3. Examples
For brevity, we consider two examples here: a finite game of complete information and
interval data with a linear model.
2.3.1. Finite Game of Complete Information. Consider the setting of a complete infor-
mation N player game with binary actions, and let A be the finite action space for each
player.5 Suppose that the payoff for player i playing a˜ ∈ A when all other players are
playing a−i = (aj)j 6=i is given by pii(a˜, a−i,W ) for a map pii, where W = (X, ε) is a payoff-
relevant characteristic vector of player i. For each a ∈ AN , we define
T (a) =
{
w : pii(ai, a−i, w) ≥ max
a′∈A
pii(a
′, a−i, w),∀i = 1, ..., N
}
.(4)
Hence if w belongs to T (a), a is a Nash equilibrium for the game with w, so that the set
A(w) = {a ∈ AN : w ∈ T (a)}(5)
represents the set of equilibria for the game with w. Let η be a random vector taking values
in AN where the conditional distribution G(·|w) of η given w has a support in A(w). Let
Y = (Yi)
N
i=1 be the observed action profile that comes from a Nash equilibrium η of the
5A special case is the two player entry game used by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) and Tamer (2003) among
others.
6game after the Nature draws η from G(·|w). Then, we can write
Y = g(W ; η),(6)
where g = [g1, ..., gN ]′ and
g(w; η) =
∑
a∈A(w)
1{η = a}a.
The conditional distribution G(·|w) over η represents the equilibrium selection rule.
2.3.2. Interval Data with a Linear Model. Consider a situation with top coded data with
threshold variables Z1 < Z2, where an outcome Y ∗ is observed as it is when Y ∗ ≤ Z1, but
it is only known to lie in some interval [Z1, Z2] otherwise. We observe Z1, Z2, the random
variable Y which equals Y ∗ if Y ∗ ≤ Z1 and Z1 otherwise, and a vector of covariates X1.
For example, X1 represents a vector of covariates for each worker such as age, education,
experience, gender, and Y is the log of the hourly wage.
It is assumed that the latent Y ∗ follows:
Y ∗ = X ′1θ + ε.
Let Z˜1 = Z˜2 = Y = Y ∗ if Y ∗ ≤ Z1, and Z˜1 = Z1 and Z˜2 = Z2 if Y ∗ > Z1. It is straightfor-
ward that the identified set is given by
(7) ΘP = {θ ∈ Rk : E[Z˜1|X1] ≤ X ′1θ ≤ E[Z˜2|X1]}.
This model admits multiple reduced forms in the sense that when Y ∗ > Z1, the structural
causal relation between Y and other external variables Z1, Z2, X1 and ε are left ambiguous.
Let us assume that when Y ∗ > Z1, Y is realized to be
Y = ηZ1 + (1− η)Z2,
where η is a variable taking values in [0, 1] and is potentially correlated with X1, Z1, Z2.
Then, we can write
Y = g(X, ε; η),
where X = (X1, Z1, Z2), and
g(X, ε; η) =
{
ηZ1 + (1− η)Z2, if X ′1θ + ε > Z1,
X ′1θ + ε, if X
′
1θ + ε ≤ Z1.
(8)
The distribution G of η plays a role analogous to the equilibrium selection rule in a game-
theoretic model.
73. Locally Robust Refinement
3.1. Overview
Suppose that the reduced-form g in (3) is parametrized as follows:
Y = gβ0,γ0(W ; η),(9)
where β0 is a parameter of interest taking values inB and γ0 is a nuisance parameter taking
values in Γ. The counterfactual experiment involves changing the distribution FP of W to
a counterfactual distribution F˜P . Let us consider the counterfactual average structural
outcome:
ASOθ0,P (G) =
∫ ∫
gθ0(w; η)dG(η|w)dF˜P (w).
This is the average value of outcome Y when a counterfactual change is made to the
distribution of W while everything else remains the same. Let Θ˜P be the set of values for
θ0 = (β0, γ0) that are permitted in a counterfactual scenario.6 Our focus is on a subset of
Θ˜P at which ASOθ,P (G) behaves robustly as we perturb the “equilibrium selection rule”
G. The researcher usually knows little about the equilibrium selection rule G. Hence if
the researcher needs to focus on a subset of Θ˜P , it appears reasonable to focus on a set
that gives a counterfactual prediction that is robust to perturbations of the equilibrium
selection rule.
More formally, let us define for each (β, γ) ∈ B × Γ,
ASO∆β,γ,P (G) = sup
G′∈N(G)
‖ASOβ,γ,P (G′)− ASOβ,γ,P (G)‖,
where ‖ · ‖ denotes the Euclidean norm and N(G) is a “neighborhood” of G which is to be
defined precisely later. Then, we define the subset of Θ˜LRRP ⊂ Θ˜P to be one in which the
value of nuisance parameter γ is a minimizer of ASO∆β,γ,P (G) over γ. More specifically, for
each β, if we let
ΓLRRP (β,G) = argminγ:(β,γ)∈Θ˜PASO
∆
β,γ,P (G),
we define
Θ˜LRRP = {(β, γ) ∈ Θ˜P : γ ∈ ΓLRRP (β,G), β ∈ BP , G ∈ G},(10)
where G denotes the collection of G’s permitted in the model, and BP is the identified set
for β0. We call the subset Θ˜LRRP the Locally Robust Refinement (LRR) of Θ˜P .
6In most cases, Θ˜P is taken to be the identified set for (β0, γ0). Sometimes, though, we might be interested
in a counterfactual setting which sets some of those parameters to a specific value outside of the identified
set ΘP .
8Despite the impression that finding the set Θ˜LRRP might be computationally intensive as
it involves layers of optimization, it is not, due to our characterization result in the next
section.
3.2. Characterization of the Locally Robust Refinement
To derive a characterization of the LRR, let us introduce some geometric structure
on the space of equilibrium selection rules G. Let G be the collection of all the condi-
tional distributions G (of η given W ) which are dominated by a measure µ such that∫
(dG/dµ)2(η|w)dµ(η) < ∞ for all G ∈ G and w ∈ W, with W denoting the set W takes
values from. Let us introduce the following metric on G: for G,G′ ∈ G,
δG(G′, G) =
∫ ∫ (
dG′
dµ
− dG
dµ
)2
(η|w)dµ(η)dF˜P (w).(11)
For any K > 0, we introduce a K-sensitivity of ASOβ,γ(G) as we perturb G around in its
K-neighborhood:
Sβ,γ,P (G;K) = sup
G′∈G:δG(G′,G)≤K
‖ASOβ,γ,P (G′)− ASOβ,γ,P (G)‖
δG(G′, G)
.(12)
The quantity Sβ,γ,P (G;K) measures the maximal rate of change of counterfactual average
outcome whenG is perturbed within itsK-neighborhood. We search for values of nuisance
parameters γ which minimize this sensitivity (up to a small constant κ.) With some small
κ > 0, we define the κ-LRR set for γ corresponding to β as
ΓLRRP (β;κ) = {γ ∈ ΓP (β) : Sβ,γ,P (G;K) ≤ Sβ,γ˜,P (G;K) + κ, for all γ˜ ∈ ΓP (β)} ,(13)
where ΓP (β) = {γ ∈ Γ : (β, γ) ∈ Θ˜P}, i.e., the set of nuisance parameters that are admitted
in the counterfactual analysis together with given β. As we show below, this set does not
depend on the choice of K > 0 or that of G ∈ G.
We now provide a useful characterization of the set Sβ,γ(G;K). For this, we define
∆β,γ(w; η) = gβ,γ(w; η)−
∫
gβ,γ(w; η)dµ(η).
The function ∆β,γ(w; η) is a conditional mean-deviation form of the structural function
gβ,γ(w; η). This function plays a central role in the characterization result. Let us make
the following assumption that guarantees that the average variability of this conditional
mean-deviation is well defined.
Assumption 3.1. For each β ∈ B and γ ∈ ΓP (β), QLRRP (β, γ) <∞, where
QLRRP (β, γ) =
∫ ∫
‖∆β,γ(w; η)‖2dµ(η)dF˜P (w).(14)
9In applications where we can compute gβ,γ(w; η) for each value of η, we can evaluate
QLRRP (β, γ) easily. (See Section 3.3 below for examples.) The following theorem shows that
the set ΓLRRP (β;κ) is fully characterized through the function Q
LRR
P (β, γ).
Theorem 3.1. Suppose that Assumption 3.1 holds. Then for each β ∈ B and γ ∈ ΓP (β),
Sβ,γ(G;K) = K
√
QLRRP (β, γ),(15)
for all G ∈ G and all K > 0.
Thus the κ-LRR of γ can be rewritten as
ΓLRRP (β;κ) =
{
γ ∈ ΓP (β) : QLRRP (β, γ) ≤ QLRRP (β, γ˜) + κ, for all γ˜ ∈ ΓP (β)
}
.(16)
The κ-LRR of the nuisance parameter vector γ0 is the set of γ’s which minimize the average
variability of gβ,γ(w; η) (around its mean) as we perturb η.
3.3. Examples
3.3.1. Entry Game with Nash Equilibria. Consider the setting of a 2x2 complete infor-
mation entry games, such as the empirical setting in Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) and
Ciliberto and Tamer (2009), where there are two firms, i = 1, 2, which decide to enter a
market or not. The entry decisions of the firms can then be formulated as
D1 = 1{β1,0D2 +X ′γ1,0 ≥ ε1}, and(17)
D2 = 1{β2,0D1 +X ′γ2,0 ≥ ε2},
where β1,0D2 +X ′γ1,0−ε1 represents the payoff difference for firm 1 between entering and
not entering the market, Di = 1 represents the entrance decision by firm i and Di = 0
the decision not to enter by firm i. The random vectors X and ε represent respectively the
observed and unobserved characteristics of firms 1 and 2 combined. The coefficients β1,0
and β2,0 capture strategic interactions between firms, whereas the coefficients γ1,0 and γ2,0
measure the roles of firm specific and market specific characteristics.
In order to find a reduced form as in (3), we first put
Y = (D1, D2), and ε = (ε1, ε2),
10
Model Predicts
(0,1)
Model Predicts
(0,1) or (1,0)
Model Predicts
(1,1)
Model Predicts
(0,0)
Model Predicts
(1,0)
Region of Multiple Equilibria
In the DGP
Region of Multiple Equilibria
In the Counterfactual Setting
ε2
ε1
FIGURE 1. Locally Robust Refinement for the Entry Game Example
Notes: The figure is based on Figure 1 of Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) and presents a graphical analysis
of the LRR for the entry game example. In the data, the region in light blue is the region of multiple
equilibria which is the set A3,θ(X) ∩ A4,θ(X). In our counterfactual setting involving X changed to X˜,
this region becomes A3,θ(X˜)∩A4,θ(X˜) depicted as the dark blue rectangle in the right hand side figure.
The LRR chooses nuisance parameters in their identified set that minimize the probability mass in the
dark blue region.
where Y ∈ Y = {(0, 0), (1, 1), (0, 1), (1, 0)}. Define
A1,θ0(X) = {(e1, e2) : X ′γ1,0 < e1, X ′γ2,0 < e2}
A2,θ0(X) = {(e1, e2) : β1,0 +X ′γ1,0 ≥ e1, β2,0 +X ′γ2,0 ≥ e2}
A3,θ0(X) = {(e1, e2) : β1,0 +X ′γ1,0 < e1, X ′γ2,0 ≥ e2},
A4,θ0(X) = {(e1, e2) : X ′γ1,0 ≥ e1, β2,0 +X ′γ2,0 < e2}.
Let gβ,γ(x, ε; η) = (gβ,γ,1(x, ε), gβ,γ,2(x, ε)), where for a random variable η ∈ [0, 1],
gβ,γ,1(x, ε; η) = 1{(ε1, ε2) ∈ A2,θ(x)}+ 1{(ε1, ε2) ∈ A4,θ(x)}η(18)
+1{(ε1, ε2) ∈ A4\3,θ(x)}(1− η),
and
gβ,γ,2(x, ε; η) = 1{(ε1, ε2) ∈ A2,θ(x)}+ 1{(ε1, ε2) ∈ A3,θ(x)}η(19)
+1{(ε1, ε2) ∈ A3\4,θ(x)}(1− η).
Then we can write reduced forms for Y as
Y = gβ0,γ0(X, ε; η).
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Let the distribution G of η be a continuous distribution and represent the equilibrium
selection rule.7 From (14), we find that
QLRRP (β, γ) =
1
4
∫
P{(ε1, ε2) ∈ A4,θ(x) ∩ A3,θ(x)}dF˜X(x)(20)
+
1
4
∫
P{(ε1, ε2) ∈ A3,θ(x) ∩ A4,θ(x)}dF˜X(x)
=
1
2
∫
P{(ε1, ε2) ∈ A4,θ(x) ∩ A3,θ(x)}dF˜X(x).
We find the LRR by using this QLRRP (β, γ) in (16).
When (ε1, ε2) fall in the region A4,θ(x) ∩ A3,θ(x), the game exhibits multiple equilibria.
Our counterfactuals are most robust if this region is minimal. We cannot altogether disre-
gard this region, because observations in the data may permit this region and it is possible
they may arise in the counterfactual setting. Nevertheless, we can choose nuisance param-
eter(s) (in their identified set) that minimize the average region of multiple equilibria for
the counterfactuals. (See Figure 1 for illustration of this observation.)
3.3.2. Interval Data. Let us look for QLRRP (β, γ) for the interval data example from Section
2.3.2. From (8), we write
gβ,γ(x, ε; η) = (x
′
1θ + ε) + (η(z1 − z2) + z2 − x′1θ − ε)1{x′1θ + ε ≥ z1},
where x = (x′1, z1, z2). We take G to be a continuous distribution on [0, 1] with the domina-
tion measure µ taken to be the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. Thus, we find that
QLRRP (β, γ) =
1
12
∫
(z1 − z2)2(1− Fε(z1 − x′1,1β − x′1,2γ))dF˜ (x1, z1, z2).(21)
The constant factor 1/12 comes from the variance of the uniform distribution on [0, 1]
which we can ignore when we compute ΓLRRP (β;κ).
In this example, the multiplicity of reduced forms stems from the lack of observations
between Z1 and Z2. Therefore, the most robust counterfactual scenario is one in which the
probability of the outcome lying in the interval [Z1, Z2] is minimal. The LRR minimizes this
probability. We cannot set such probability to be 0, because it is inconsistent with data.
7Instead of taking G to be a continuous distribution, we may consider it to be a discrete distribution with a
support {0, 1}. Then the dominating measure µ is taken to be a counting measure on {0, 1} instead of the
Lebesgue measure on [0, 1]. With this change, QLRRP (β, γ) becomes a constant multiple of the expression on
the right hand side of (20). Thus the LRR remains invariant with this change of G into a discrete distribution.
8In the case described above, X1 is binary and we have that:
ΘP = {θ ∈ R2 : E[Z˜1|X1,2 = 0] ≤ β ≤ E[Z˜2|X1,2 = 0] and E[Z˜1|X1,2 = 1] ≤ β + γ ≤ E[Z˜2|X1,2 = 1}.
The inequalities in the definition of ΘP yield the parallelogram shown in gray.
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(A) Example 1 (B) Example 2
FIGURE 2. Locally Robust Refinement for the Interval Data Case
Notes: The figure presents two examples of the LRR for the interval data model. These examples are
inspired by the empirical example of Romano and Shaikh (2010). In particular, X1,i = (1, X1,2,i), with
X1,2,i a binary discrete random variable (e.g. gender). Under this set-up, θ = (β, γ), the parameter of
interest is the intercept (β) and the nuisance parameter is the slope (γ). The identified set for those
parameters is given by adapting equation (7), which defines a parallelogram shown in dark gray8.
In counterfactuals which change X1,2, the identified set changes to the one in light gray, although it
remains a parallelogram. The LRR picks γ that minimizes (21). Here, this means picking γ equal to the
red dot. It follows that the LRR for β (in bold red on the y-axis) is the projection on the y-axis of the
counterfactual identified set (light gray) evaluated at this selected γ (red dot). It is smaller than the
original identified set for β (in bold black).
Nevertheless, we can at least choose our nuisance parameters that minimize it. This is
shown graphically with two examples in Figure 2.
4. Inference with the Locally Robust Refinement
4.1. Subvector Inference with Constrained Profiling: Overview
Suppose that the parameters θ = (β, γ) are identified as
ΘP = {(β, γ) ∈ Θ : QP (β, γ) = 0} ,
where QP (β, γ) is a nonnegative population function of parameters which depends on the
distribution P of observed variables. (We will see an example of QP in moment inequality
models later.)9 A standard way of doing inference on β (based on profiling) is as follows.
9When the minimum value of the objective function is not zero, we can redefine QP (β, γ) as QP (β, γ) −
inf β¯∈B,γ¯∈ΓQP (β¯, γ¯).
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First, define
ΓP (β) = {γ ∈ Γ : QP (β, γ) = 0} .
Let Qˆ(β, γ) be the sample analogue of QP (β, γ). Then, we define a profiled statistic:
T (β) = an inf
γ∈Γ
Qˆ(β, γ),
where an is a normalizing sequence. For the confidence set, let ζ(β) be a random variable
whose distribution approximates T (β), and let c1−α(β) be the 1 − α percentile from the
distribution of ζ(β). Then the confidence region for β is given by
C1−α = {β ∈ B : T (β) ≤ c1−α(β)}.
The idea of inference using profiling goes back to at least Barndorff-Nielsen (1983).
Romano and Shaikh (2008) proposed subvector inference on the identified set with a
profiling approach. The profiling approach was substantially extended by Bugni, Canay,
and Shi (2017). See also Kaido, Molinari, and Stoye (2017) for a different method of
subvector inference.
Our inference on LRR is a modified version of such a profiling approach. First, we define
for a small number κ > 0,
ΓLRRP (β;κ) =
{
γ ∈ ΓP (β) : QLRRP (β, γ) ≤ inf
γ¯∈Γ
QLRRP (β, γ¯) + κ
}
.(22)
(In practice one can choose a small number such as κ = 0.0025.) Then we let a κ-LRR set
for β be as follows:
BLRRP (κ) = {β ∈ B : ΓLRRP (β;κ) 6= ∅}.(23)
Thus the counterfactual setting that we focus on is one where β0 ∈ BLRRP (κ). To construct
a confidence set for β0 in this set-up, we take the following steps.
Step 1: We take
ΓˆLRR(β; 2κ) =
{
γ ∈ Γˆ(β) : QˆLRR(β, γ) ≤ inf
γ¯∈Γ
QˆLRR(β, γ¯) + 2κ
}
,(24)
where QˆLRR(β, γ) is a sample version of QLRRP (β, γ) and
10
Γˆ(β) =
{
γ ∈ Γ : Qˆ(β, γ) ≤ inf
γ¯∈Γ
Qˆ(β, γ¯)
}
.
10We take 2κ here instead of κ to cover the samping variations of QˆLRR(β, γ) so that the asymptotic validity
of the procedure is ensured.
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Step 2: We construct a test statistic with γ profiled out with a constraint:
T LRR(β) = an inf
γ∈ΓˆLRR(β;2κ)
Qˆ(β, γ).(25)
Let ζLRR(β) be a random variable whose distribution approximates that of T LRR(β) (with
large samples), and let cLRR1−α(β) be the 1 − α percentile from the distribution of ζLRR(β).
Then the confidence region for β is given by
CLRR1−α = {β ∈ B : T LRR(β) ≤ cLRR1−α(β)}.(26)
Typically CLRR1−α is substantially smaller than C1−α. As for c
LRR
1−α(β), one can use bootstrap.
Details for the case of moment inequality models are provided in the next section.
4.2. Inference from Moment Inequality Models
While the subvector inference with the LRR constraint applies more generally, we focus
here on moment inequality models for the sake of concreteness. We apply the constrained
profiling approach of subvector inference to the moment inequality models. For this, let us
consider the following moment inequality models:
EP [mj(Wi, θ0)] ≤ 0, for j = 1, ..., p, and
EP [mj(Wi, θ0)] = 0, for j = p+ 1, ..., k.
We assume that the moment restrictions define the identified set ΘP so that for all θ ∈ ΘP ,
the moment restrictions are satisfied. Define
mj(θ) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
mj(Wi, θ).
We let for each q ≥ 1,
Qˆ(β, γ) =
p∑
j=1
[
mj(θ)
σˆj(θ)
]q
+
+
k∑
j=p+1
∣∣∣∣mj(θ)σˆj(θ)
∣∣∣∣q ,(27)
where σˆ2j (θ) represents the estimated variance of mj(Wi, θ), i.e.,
σˆ2j (θ) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(mj(Wi, θ)−mj(θ))2 ,(28)
and [a]+ = max{a, 0}, a ∈ R. Then, we construct T LRR(β) as in (25) with an = nq/2.
As for critical values, we may consider two different approaches. The first approach is
based on least favorable configurations. The second approach is a more refined version
with enhanced power properties but with a higher computational cost.
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As for the first approach, we consider the following:11 for q ≥ 1,
Qˆ∗(β, γ) =
p∑
j=1
[
m∗j(θ)−mj(θ)
σˆj(θ)
]q
+
+
k∑
j=p+1
∣∣∣∣m∗j(θ)−mj(θ)σˆj(θ)
∣∣∣∣q ,
where
m∗j(θ) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
mj(W
∗
i , θ),(29)
and W ∗i ’s are resampled from the empirical distribution of Wi’s with replacement. Let
Tˆ LRR∗(β) = nq/2 inf
γ∈ΓˆLRR(β;0)
Qˆ∗(β, γ).
We take critical values cˆ1−α(β) to be the (1−α)100%-percentile of the bootstrap distribution
of Tˆ LRR∗(β).
As for the second approach, there are various alternative ways to construct inference that
improves upon the one that is based on least favorable configurations. For example, one
may use moment selection procedures as in Hansen (2005), Andrews and Soares (2010)
and Andrews and Shi (2013), or the contact set method in Linton, Song, and Whang
(2010), or a Bonferroni-based procedure as in Romano, Shaikh, and Wolf (2014). Here
we use the latter because formulating low level conditions is simpler with their approach
in our context. However, we cannot directly use their proofs, because their procedure
involves neither empirical processes nor subvector inference as ours does.
First, we take 0 < α1 < α (say, α1 = 0.005) and find κˆα1(θ) such that
lim inf
n→∞
inf
P∈P
inf
θ∈Θ
P
{
max
1≤j≤k
√
n(EP [mj(Wi, θ)]−mj(θ))
σˆj(θ)
≤ κˆα1(θ)
}
≥ 1− α1,(30)
where P denotes the collection of distributions of Wi that satisfies the assumptions in the
model. We can obtain κˆα1(θ) using bootstrap by taking the (1−α1)100%-th percentile from
the bootstrap distribution of
max
1≤j≤k
√
n(mj(θ)−m∗j(θ))
σˆj(θ)
,(31)
using m∗j(θ) defined in (29). The uniform asymptotic validity of such a bootstrap procedure
is well known in the literature. (See also Section 8.3 in the Appendix for details.) Define
λˆj,α1(θ) = min
{
mj(θ) +
σˆj(θ)κˆα1(θ)√
n
, 0
}
.(32)
11We take this form of a test statistic for the sake of concreteness. One can use different functionals to
produce different test statistics. See Andrews and Shi (2013) for various functionals.
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Let
Q˜∗(β, γ) =
p∑
j=1
[
m∗j(θ)−mj(θ) + λˆj,α1(θ)
σˆj(θ)
]q
+
+
k∑
j=p+1
∣∣∣∣m∗j(θ)−mj(θ)σˆj(θ)
∣∣∣∣q .(33)
As compared to Qˆ∗(β, γ) in (29), Q˜∗(β, γ) involves the additional term λˆj,α1(θ) which is
always non-positive, and substantially negative when mj(θ) is so. This makes the critical
value based on the bootstrap distribution of Q˜∗(β, γ) tend to be smaller than that from
Qˆ∗(β, γ), making the inference less conservative. We construct a bootstrap test statistic as
follows:
T˜ LRR∗(β) = nq/2 inf
γ∈ΓˆLRR(β;0)
Q˜∗(β, γ).
We take critical values cˆ1−α+α1(β) to be the (1 − α + α1)100%-percentile of the bootstrap
distribution of T˜ LRR∗(β). Then, we construct the confidence region for β0 as follows:
CLRR1−α =
{
β ∈ B : T˜ LRR∗(β) ≤ cˆ1−α+α1(β)
}
.(34)
4.3. Uniform Asymptotic Validity
This section is devoted to proving the uniform validity of the inference on LRR. We first
assume the following.
Assumption 4.1. (i) For each ε > 0,
lim inf
n→∞
sup
P∈P
P
{
sup
θ∈Θ
∣∣∣QˆLRR(θ)−QLRR(θ)∣∣∣ > ε} = 0.(35)
(ii) For each α1 ∈ (0, 1), κˆα1 satisfies (30).
Assumption 4.1(i) is a mild condition which requires uniform consistency of the sample
criterion function for the LRR (uniform in θ ∈ Θ and P ∈ P). Typically, QLRRP (β, γ) takes
the following form:
QLRRP (β, γ) =
∫
q(x; β, γ)dF˜P (x),
for some map q. Let Fˆ (x) and qˆ(x; β, γ) be the estimated versions of F˜P (x) and q(x; β, γ)
using which we construct
QˆLRRP (β, γ) =
∫
qˆ(x; β, γ)dFˆ (x).
Thus, we can find lower level conditions for (35) in terms of Fˆ (x) and qˆ(x; β, γ). Assump-
tion 4.1(ii) is typically satisfied when we take κˆα1(θ) from the bootstrap distribution of
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(31). (For example, see Andrews and Shi (2013), Romano, Shaikh, and Wolf (2014), and
Lee, Song, and Whang (2018).)
We let
mj,P (θ) = EP [mj(Wi, θ)], and σ2j,P (θ) = VarP (mj(Wi, θ)),(36)
where VarP denotes the variance under P . Let
µi,j,P (θ) =
mj(Wi, θ)
σj,P (θ)
.(37)
Let us make the following assumption.
Assumption 4.2. (i) There exist C > 0 and q ≥ 2 such that
max
1≤j≤k
sup
P∈P
EP
[
sup
θ∈Θ
|µi,j,P (θ)|q+1
]
< C.(38)
(ii) There exists C > 0 such that for any δ > 0 and any θ ∈ Θ,
max
1≤j≤k
sup
P∈P
EP
[
sup
θ′∈Θ:‖θ−θ′‖≤δ
|µ˜i,j,P (θ′)− µ˜i,j,P (θ′)|2
]
< Cδ2,(39)
where µ˜i,j,P (θ) = µi,j,P (θ)− EP [µi,j,P (θ)].
(iii) Θ is compact.
Assumption 4.2(i) is a uniform moment condition. Assumption 4.2(ii) imposes the con-
dition of L2-equicontinuity on the function µ˜i,j,P (θ). This condition, similar in spirit to
Chen, Linton, and Van Keilegom (2003), is used to verify the asymptotic equicontinuity of
the empirical process involved in Qˆ(β, γ) and its bootstrap version.
We now introduce an assumption on the limit Gaussian process of the empirical process.
First, let us introduce some notation. Let {νj,P (θ) : θ ∈ Θ} be a Gaussian process having
covariance function equal to CovP (µi,j,P (θ), µi,j,P (θ′)), θ, θ′ ∈ Θ. Let for M > 0,
ζM,P (β; r) = inf
γ∈ΓLRRP (β;κ)
p∑
j=1
([νj,P + rj]
q
+(θ) ∧M q) ,(40)
where r = (rj)
p
j=1 is a vector of real measurable maps on Θ. Define
RM = {(rj)pj=1 : rj is measurable, and −M ≤ rj(·) ≤ 0, for all j = 1, ..., p}.(41)
Assumption 4.3. For any M > 0 and any 0 < c < pM q,
sup
r∈RM
sup
P∈P
sup
β∈BLRRP (κ)
P{c− ε ≤ ζM,P (β; r) ≤ c+ ε} → 0,(42)
as ε→ 0, where BLRRP (κ) is as defined in (23).
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This condition is a mild regularity condition for the Gaussian process νP , which is gener-
ically satisfied because the Gaussian process has an unbounded support. (Note that RM is
a collection of vectors of functions that are bounded between −M and 0.) The assump-
tion can be violated when νj,P (θ) has zero variance at some point θ = (β, γ) such that
γ ∈ ΓLRRP (β).
The following theorem gives the uniform asymptotic validity of the confidence region
CLRR1−α defined in (34).
Theorem 4.1. Suppose that Assumptions 4.1 and 4.2 hold. Then,
lim inf
n→∞
inf
P∈P
inf
β∈BLRRP (κ)
P
{
β ∈ CLRR1−α
} ≥ 1− α.(43)
The proof of Theorem 4.1 is found in the Appendix. For the proof of uniform asymptotic
validity, we approximate the bootstrap distribution by an appropriately truncated version
of a functional of a Gaussian process. This facilitates the use of the continuous mapping
theorem in Linton, Song, and Whang (2010) which does not require that the continuous
functionals have a well defined limit.
5. Monte Carlo Simulations
5.1. Simulation Design
In this section, we present results from a Monte Carlo simulation study on the finite sam-
ple properties of the inference procedure developed previously. We focus on the interval
data example considered in Section 3.3.2. That is, while the true model is Y ∗ = X ′1θ0 + ε,
the researcher does not observe Y ∗ when Y ∗ > Z1 only knowing it belongs to [Z1, Z2]. We
draw ε from the standard normal distribution.
For these simulations, we consider a simple set-up similar to the empirical example in
Romano and Shaikh (2010). Let X1 be a 2-dimensional object, where X1,i = [1, X˜i], where
X˜i is drawn from a Bernoulli distribution with probability p = 0.5. Hence, p represents the
share of a gender, race or a discrete characteristic in the population. The researcher may
want to study the gender-wage gap in the presence of top-coded data (i.e. the parameter
of interest is β, the slope coefficient), or study the average effect of a job training program
when there are different characteristics (in this case, the parameter of interest β is the
coefficient on the intercept). We focus on the latter situation by setting our parameter of
interest (β) to be the intercept (coefficient on 1), and γ to be the coefficient on X˜i. The
identified set is characterized by two sets of moment inequalities in (7).
We consider two cases: one case where parameters (β, γ) are such that the moments
are close to equalities, and the other case where they are not. For the first case, we set
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(β, γ, Z1, Z2) = (−1.2, 2, 2.5, 3). We call this set-up least favorable.12 The second case uses
parameter values for (β, γ, Z1, Z2) = (0, 2, 2.5, 4) so that the moment inequalities are far
from binding. For both cases, we show results with and without using LRR. Furthermore,
we show the results with and without the Bonferroni-based modification proposed by Ro-
mano, Shaikh, and Wolf (2014).
In both cases, for the LRR, we construct the statistic T LRR(β) following Step 2 in (25)
with κ = 0.0025, an = nq/2, and q = 1. The confidence interval follows the computation in
(34). We set the nominal size at 0.05, the simulation number to 1000, and the bootstrap
number to 999.
5.2. Results
The results, both for the coverage probability and the length of the confidence interval
are shown in Table 1. The results show that the average length of the confidence interval
decreases with n, and this decrease is conspicuous when we use the LRR. Furthermore,
the refinement substantially reduces the confidence interval length when compared to the
confidence interval without LRR. This is partly due to considering only a subset of the
identified set instead of the full set. As a result, our approach is computationally cheaper
than other approaches. As expected with a profiling approach, the inference exhibits con-
servative coverage probabilities in both specifications, with and without the LRR.
The Bonferroni-based modification proposed by Romano, Shaikh, and Wolf (2014) re-
duces the length of the confidence intervals but only marginally in our simulation setup.
As expected, this modification is most effective, when the DGP is away from the least
favorable configuration. However, this modification comes at the computational cost of
calculating the term κα1 via a bootstrap procedure for every value of θ in a first step. This
step could be time consuming when the dimension of θ is large.
Figure 3 shows the stability of the LRR as we perturb the equilibrium selection. The
result is based on the set-up of the “Non-Least Favorable Case” of Table 1 with n = 200,
where we consider different values of η = {0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8} (i.e. different distributions of
η with mass points at those values), which represent various scenarios of the distributions
of income that we do not observe (above Z1). The counterfactual predictions change with
η, because the realized values of Y ∗ become closer to Z1 as η increases. This decreases the
average counterfactual effect (as it decreases Y ∗).13
12If we used the true γ and no profiling, we would find coverage probability close to 95%. This is what we
find in simulations, with the results available from the authors due to space considerations.
13Note that changing the distribution of η does not affect the confidence set for β (with or without LRR) in
this particular example. This is because the distribution of η only affects the outcomes Y ∗ for observations
above the threshold Z1. However, we do not actually observe those outcomes above Z1. We only use the mass
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TABLE 1. The Empirical Coverage Probability and Average Length of Confidence
Intervals for β0 at 95% Nominal Level.
Coverage Probability
Least Favorable Non-Least Favorable
β Conservative Bonferroni Mod. Conservative Bonferroni Mod.
No LRR n = 200 1 1 1 1
n = 1000 1 1 1 1
LRR n = 200 0.9970 0.9970 0.9980 0.9940
n = 1000 0.9990 0.9970 1 0.9930
Average Length of CI
Least Favorable Non-Least Favorable
β Conservative Bonferroni Mod. Conservative Bonferroni Mod.
No LRR n = 200 1.4989 1.4933 1.7214 1.7103
n = 1000 1.4760 1.4734 1.6978 1.6924
LRR n = 200 0.5880 0.5880 0.9231 0.8552
n = 1000 0.2755 0.2376 0.6647 0.6346
Notes: The first half of the table reports the empirical coverage probability of the confidence interval
for β computed with the bootstrap procedure described in the main text, and the second half reports
its average length. “Bonferroni Mod.” represents Bonferroni-based modification proposed by Romano,
Shaikh, and Wolf (2014) in inference on moment inequality restrictions. The columns with “Conserva-
tive” correspond to not using this modification. For the least favorable case, we use parameter values
β = −1.2, γ = 2, Z1 = 2.5, Z2 = 3 which yield moment inequalities that are very close to be binding.
For the second specification, we set β = 0, γ = 2, Z1 = 2.5 and Z2 = 4, which yields moment inequali-
ties that are far from binding. In each case, we present results for sample sizes of n = 200, 1000, with
bootstrap number B = 999 and the simulation number R = 1000.
As shown in Figure 3, the average value of the counterfactual Y varies less across spec-
ifications when we use LRR compared to not using LRR (the LRR mean prediction varies
from -0.91 to -0.81, compared to -1.41 to -1.21 for the identified set). This is a result of
the robustness property of LRR. The mean predictions vary less with LRR than without.
Furthermore, there is a smaller range of counterfactual effects predicted by LRR, and this
range also varies less than without the refinement. Thus the LRR delivers stable predictions
across specifications.
6. Empirical Application: Top-Coded Data
We provide an empirical application to illustrate how our procedure works with data.
The application considers the case of top coded data, as in the Monte Carlo. We use the
of observations above Z1, which does not change with η. This can be seen by equation (21) whose minimizer
defines LRR and in equation (7) for the identified set. Neither expression includes G or η. Nevertheless, η
still affects the counterfactual outcome because we report the counterfactual outcome Y ∗ (including the
values of Y ∗ above Z1).
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FIGURE 3. Robustness of Counterfactual Predictions - With and Without LRR
Notes: The figure presents the average counterfactual outcomes (Y ) with and without the LRR over a
range of different specifications (η = {0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8}). The simulation set-up is β = 0, γ = −1.2, Z1 =
2.5, Z2 = 4 (the non-least favorable case of Table 1 above), and sample size n = 200, 100 simulations
and bootstrap number B = 999. The solid lines represent the average range of counterfactual outcomes
predicted in simulations, while the circle presents the mean of that range. The LRR case (in red) has a
mean and range of effects that vary less than when one considers the full identified set (in black).
data from the 2000 Annual Demographic Supplement of the Current Population Survey
(CPS) and follow the set-up from Romano and Shaikh (2010). That is, we keep individuals
who are college graduates between 20 and 24 of age, white, with a primary source of
income that is wages and salaries and that worked at least 2 hours per week on average.
This results in a sample of 305 individuals. Differently than their work, however, we do not
assume that this sample is a “true” probability distribution for simulations. We use the data
as an empirical application instead, where we do not know the true probability distribution
or the values of the parameters. We also explore the effects of different amounts of top
coding on the results.
We maintain our assumption from the Monte Carlo simulation that we are interested
in the intercept of the regression Yi = X ′1,iθ + εi, and X1,i is two-dimensional (constant,
and the variable gender). We are interested in comparing the confidence set for β without
using LRR and that using LRR. We use this data under different top coding amounts in this
sample (5% or 10%), as well as different values of the top possible wages (Z2 ∈ {106, 108}).
The results are shown in Table 2.
The confidence interval for β becomes substantially shorter, when we focus on inference
on its LRR. For this problem, the confidence intervals for β are largest when there is more
top coding and when Z2 is largest, meaning there is less information about the unobserved
incomes.
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TABLE 2. Confidence Intervals for β (Intercept), Parameter of Interest
Z2 = 10
6 Z2 = 10
8 Z2 = 10
6 Z2 = 10
8
5% top-coding 5% top-coding 10% top-coding 10% top-coding
Without LRR [0.21,4.02] [0.21,4.22] [-0.1,4.40] [-0.1,4.80]
With LRR [1.78,2.49] [1.45,3.27] [1.51,2.91] [0.84,4.00]
Notes: The table shows the results of the confidence interval for β without using LRR and using LRR.
The results are obtained without using the Bonferroni-based modification. The bootstrap number is
B = 999. The nominal size is α = 0.05.
7. Conclusion
This paper explores methods to deal with models with multiple reduced forms for coun-
terfactual analysis. As mentioned by Eizenberg (2014), there is an inherent tradeoff within
the partial identification literature: while researchers may prefer not to impose strong
identifying assumptions, they must confront the issue of counterfactuals with larger iden-
tified sets when doing policy analysis.
Our proposal to use LRR provides an alternative for researchers who are faced with set
identified counterfactuals that are too large, but do not have justifiable prior information
to use in choosing what subsets to focus on. The refinement looks at the subset of coun-
terfactual scenarios that give most reliable predictions against a range of perturbations of
the reduced forms (such as through changing equilibrium selection rules). It is shown to
have attractive features, including computational tractability, robustness and an intuitive
appeal. We develop a uniformly asymptotically valid inference approach based on subvec-
tor inference and find that the procedure has good finite sample properties, and can be
applied to the data and produce meaningful results.
8. Appendix: Mathematical Proofs
8.1. Proof of Theorem 3.1
Proof of Theorem 3.1: Let U and W be the sets η and W = (X, ε) take values from
respectively. Let H be the collection of measurable maps h :W × U such that∫
h(w, η)dµ(η) = 0, F˜P -a.s., and
∫ ∫
h2(w, η)dµ(η)dF˜P (w) <∞.(44)
We endow the inner-product 〈·, ·〉 with H as follows: for h1, h2 ∈ H,
〈h1, h2〉 =
∫ ∫
h1(w, η)h2(w, η)dµ(η)dF˜P (w).(45)
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Then (H, 〈·, ·〉) is a Hilbert space (up to an equivalence class). Define ‖h‖2 = 〈h, h〉 and
write
δG(G′, G) =
∥∥∥∥dG′dµ − dGdµ
∥∥∥∥2 ,(46)
and
ASOβ,γ(G) =
∫ ∫
gβ,γ(w; η)dG(η|w)dF˜P (w).(47)
If we define
hβ,γ(η, w) = gβ,γ(w; η)−
∫
gβ,γ(w; η)dµ(η),(48)
we can write
sup
G′∈G:δG(G′,G)≤K
|ASOβ,γ(G′)− ASOβ,γ(G)|
δG(G′, G)
= sup
h′∈H:‖h′‖=K
〈gβ,γ, h′〉 ≤ K‖hβ,γ‖,
where the first equality comes because dG′/dµ− dG/dµ ∈ H and the last inequality comes
by (44) and Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. Since hβ,γ ∈ H by Assumption 3.1, the last bound
is achieved once we take h′ in the supremum to be Khβ,γ/‖hβ,γ‖ above inequality and
hence the last inequality is in fact an equality. The last term is nothing but K
√
QLRRP (β, γ),
completing the proof. 
8.2. Proof of Theorem 4.1
8.2.1. Auxiliary Results. We introduce a theorem that gives the weak convergence of a
stochastic process to a tight limit along a given sequence of probabilities. This result is
based on Section 2.8.3 of van der Vaart and Wellner (1996). We modify the results slightly
because in our case the class of functions that index an empirical process depends on the
underlying distribution P ∈ P.
Let T be a given set and let fj,P (·; τ) : Rd → R, j = 1, ..., k, be a function indexed by
τ ∈ T , potentially depending on P ∈ P. Define for each j = 1, ..., k,
Fj,P = {fj,P (·; τ) : τ ∈ T }, and FP = {fP (·; τ) : τ ∈ T },(49)
where fP (·; τ) = [f1,P (·; τ), ..., fk,P (·; τ)]′. Given i.i.d. random vectors Xi, we introduce a
stochastic process on T :
νn,P (τ) =
1√
n
n∑
i=1
(fP (Xi; τ)− EP [fP (Xi; τ)]).
We let `∞(T ) be the set of bounded Rk-valued functions on T , and ‖ · ‖∞ denote the sup
norm on `∞(T ), i.e., ‖ν‖∞ = supτ∈T ‖ν(τ)‖, ν ∈ `∞(T ), where ‖ · ‖ denotes the Euclidean
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norm in Rk. We introduce a semimetric ρP on T as follows:
ρP (τ1, τ2) =
√
EP [‖fP (Xi; τ1)− fP (Xi; τ2)‖2].
Define the class of bouned Lipschitz functionals:
BL1 =
{
g : `∞(T )→ R : |g(ν1)− g(ν2)| ≤ ‖ν1 − ν2‖∞, and sup
ν∈`∞(T )
|g(ν)| ≤ 1
}
.(50)
Write the L2(P ) norm by ‖f‖P,2 =
√
EP‖f(Xi)‖2. Given a class FP of Rk-valued measur-
able functions, let N[](ε,FP , ‖ · ‖P,2) be the ε-bracketing entropy of FP with respect to the
L2(P ) norm, which is the smallest number N of the brackets {[`j, uj]}Nj=1 such that each
f ∈ FP satisfies `j ≤ f ≤ uj for some [`j, uj] and ‖`j − uj‖P,2 ≤ ε. (The inequalities
required of the brackets are point-wise inequalities when f is Rk-valued.)
We also define P ∗ and E∗P to be the outer-probability and and outer-expectation under
P . (See van der Vaart and Wellner (1996), Section 1.2 for details.) The following theorem
formulates conditions for the weak convergence of νn,P to a tight Gaussian limit uniformly
over P ∈ P.
Theorem 8.1. Suppose that the two conditions are satisfied.
(i) For each j = 1, ..., k, there exists a measurable envelope Fj,P for Fj,P such that
sup
P∈P
EP [F
2
j,P (Xi)] <∞.(51)
(ii) ∫ ∞
0
sup
P∈P
√
logN[](ε‖Fj,P‖P,2,Fj,P , ‖ · ‖P,2)dε <∞.(52)
Then, we have
sup
f∈BL1
sup
P∈P
|E∗P [f(νn,P )]− EP [f(νP )]| → 0, as n→∞,(53)
and
lim
δ↓0
sup
P∈P
EP
[
sup
ρP (τ1,τ2)<δ
‖νP (τ1)− νP (τ2)‖
]
= 0,(54)
where νP is a Gaussian process with covariance kernel given by
E[νP (τ1)νP (τ2)] = CovP (τ1(Xi), τ2(Xi)), τ1, τ2 ∈ T .
Proof: By following the proof of Theorem 2.8.4 of van der Vaart and Wellner (1996), we
find that Conditions (i) and (ii) give the asymptotic equicontinuity of the following form:
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for every ε > 0,
lim
δ↓0
lim sup
n→∞
sup
P∈P
P ∗
{
sup
ρP (τ1,τ2)<δ
‖νn,P (τ1)− νn,P (τ2)‖ > ε
}
= 0,(55)
and (T , ρP ) is totally bounded uniformly over P ∈ P in the sense that for any ε > 0, and
any P ∈ P there exists an mε number of ε-open balls (with respect to ρP ) that cover T
wheremε does not depend on P . Then both the results of (53) and (54) follow by Theorem
2.6 of Gine´ and Zinn (1991). 
We consider a bootstrap version of Theorem 8.1. Given a sample {X1, ..., Xn}, we let Gn
be the σ-field generated by this sample. Let Pˆ be the empirical measure of {X1, ..., Xn},
and {X∗1 , ..., X∗n} i.i.d. draws from Pˆ . First, define
ν∗n,P (τ) =
1√
n
n∑
i=1
(fP (X
∗
i ; τ)− EPˆ [fP (X∗i ; τ)]),
which is the bootstrap counterpart of νn,P .
Theorem 8.2. Suppose that the conditions of Theorem 8.1 are satisfied. Then for any ε > 0,
sup
P∈P
P
{
sup
f∈BL1
∣∣E[f(ν∗n,P )|Gn]− EP [f(νP )]∣∣ > ε}→ 0,(56)
as n→∞, where νP is the Gaussian process in Theorem 8.1.
Proof: The proof basically follows that of Lemma A.2 of Linton, Song, and Whang (2010).
The only difference here is that the class FP depends on P . As seen in the proof of Theorem
8.1, (T , ρP ) is totally bounded uniformly over P ∈ P. Thus for any given ε > 0, there is a
map piε : T → T which takes mε values and ρP (piετ, τ) ≤ ε. Take any f ∈ BL1, and consider∣∣E[f(ν∗n,P )|Gn]− EPf(νP )∣∣ ≤ ∣∣E[f(ν∗n,P )|Gn]− E[f(ν∗n,P ◦ piε)|Gn]∣∣(57)
+
∣∣E[f(ν∗n,P ◦ piε)|Gn]− EPf(νP ◦ piε)∣∣
+ |EPf(νP ◦ piε)− EPf(νP )| .
The last term vanishes uniformly in f ∈ BL1 as ε → 0 by (54). By using the proof of
Lemma 2.1 in Gine´ and Zinn (1991), p.763, and the moment condition (51) to handle the
remainder part of the process that is left over from truncation, we can show that the second
term on the right hand side vanishes in probability uniformly over P ∈ P as n → ∞. We
deal with the first term using Le Cam’s Poissonization lemma and following the proof of
Theorem 2.2 of Gine´ (1997), p.104.14 Indeed, we define T (ε, ρP ) = {τ1 − τ2 : ρP (τ1, τ2) <
14The reference Theorem 2.2 of Gine´ and Zinn (1991) on page 196 of Linton, Song, and Whang (2010)
should be Theorem 2.2 of Gine´ (1997), p.104.
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ε}, and note that
EP
[
E
[
sup
τ∈T (ε,ρP )
‖ν∗n,P (τ)‖|Gn
]]
(58)
≤ e
e− 1
{
EP
[
sup
τ∈T (ε,ρP )
∥∥∥∥∥ 1√n
n∑
i=1
(Ni − 1)(fP (Xi; τ)− EP [fP (Xi; τ)])
∥∥∥∥∥
]}
+ EP
[∣∣∣∣∣ 1√n
n∑
i=1
(Ni − 1)
∣∣∣∣∣ supτ∈T (ε,ρP )
∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
i=1
fP (Xi; τ)
∥∥∥∥∥
]
,
where Ni is i.i.d. Poisson random variables with mean 1 independent of all the other
random variables. By Theorem 8.1, both terms on the right hand, after taking supremum
over P ∈ P, vanish as n→∞ and ε→ 0. 
The following lemma is the bootstrap version of Lemma A.1 of Linton, Song, and Whang
(2010). The proof of the lemma can be proceeded similarly as in the proof of Lemma A.1
of Linton, Song, and Whang (2010) using (56) and is omitted.
Lemma 8.1. Suppose that the bootstrap empirical process ν∗n,P satisfies (56) for any ε > 0.
Let fn,P be a continuous functional on `∞(T ) that is potentially Gn-measurable such that for
some possibly Gn-measurable number Cn,P ∈ R,
|fn,P (ν1)− fn,P (ν2)| ≤ Cn,P sup
τ∈T
|ν1(τ)− ν2(τ)|(59)
and for each c ∈ A for some set A ⊂ R,
lim
ε→0
lim sup
n→∞
sup
P∈P
P {|fn,P (νP )− c| ≤ Cn,P ε} = 0.(60)
Then, for each c ∈ A and each ε > 0,
lim sup
n→∞
sup
P∈P
P
{∣∣P {fn,P (ν∗n,P ) ≤ c|Gn}− P{fn,P (νP ) ≤ c}∣∣ > ε} = 0.(61)
8.2.2. Proof of Theorem 4.1. For simplicity, we consider only the case with k = p so that
there is no equality restrictions in the model. Define
T LRRP (β;κ) = n
q/2 inf
γ∈ΓLRRP (β;κ)
Qˆ(β, γ),(62)
where ΓLRRP (β;κ) is as defined in (22) and Qˆ(β, γ) is as defined in (27). Let us consider the
pseudo confidence interval:
CLRR1−α,P (κ) =
{
β ∈ B : T LRRP (β;κ) ≤ cLRR1−α,P (β;κ)
}
,(63)
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where cLRR1−α,P (β;κ) is 1− α percentile of the bootstrap distribution of
T LRR∗P (β;κ) = n
q/2 inf
γ∈ΓLRRP (β;κ)
Q˜∗(β, γ),(64)
and Q˜∗(β, γ) is as defined in (33). For the lemmas below, we assume that the conditions
of Theorem 4.1 hold. Recall that we write θ = (β, γ) ∈ Θ generically.
Lemma 8.2.
max
1≤j≤p
sup
P∈P
P
{
sup
θ∈Θ
∣∣∣∣σj,P (θ)σˆj(θ) − 1
∣∣∣∣}→ 0,
as n→∞.
Proof: We can show this using Assumption 4.2(i) and (ii) and following the same steps
in the proof of Lemma D.2 of Bugni, Canay, and Shi (2015). Details are omitted. 
Let us take for j = 1, ..., p,
νˆn,j,P (θ) =
√
n(mj(θ)−mj,P (θ))
σˆj(θ)
, and(65)
ν˜n,j,P (θ) =
√
n(mj(θ)−mj,P (θ))
σj,P (θ)
,
and let νˆn,P = [νˆn,1,P , ..., νˆn,p,P ]′, and ν˜n,P = [ν˜n,1,P , ..., ν˜n,p,P ]′. Similarly, we also take for
j = 1, ..., p,
ν˜∗n,j(θ) =
√
n(m∗j(θ)−mj(θ))
σj,P (θ)
, and(66)
νˆ∗n,j(θ) =
√
n(m∗j(θ)−mj(θ))
σˆj(θ)
and let ν˜∗n = [ν˜
∗
n,1, ..., ν˜
∗
n,p]
′ and νˆ∗n = [νˆ
∗
n,1, ..., νˆ
∗
n,p]
′.
Lemma 8.3. There exists a tight Borel measurable Gaussian process νP on Θ such that
sup
f∈BL1
sup
P∈P
|E∗P [f(ν˜n,P )]− EP [f(νP )]| → 0, as n→∞,(67)
and for each ε > 0,
sup
P∈P
P
{
sup
f∈BL1
|E[f(ν˜∗n)|Gn]− EP [f(νP )]| > ε
}
→ 0, as n→∞.(68)
Proof: For the first statement, we use Theorem 8.1, and verify the conditions there.
To map the current set-up to that of Theorem 8.1, we take T = Θ and set, identifying
τ = θ ∈ Θ, fj,P (Wi, τ) = mj(Wi; θ)/σj,P (θ). Condition (i) of the theorem follows by
Assumption 4.2(i), and Condition (ii) by Assumption 4.2(ii) and the assumption that Θ
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is compact. Thus (67) follows by Theorem 8.1. By Theorem 8.2, the second statement
follows similarly. 
We define
qn,j,P (θ) =
√
nmj,P (θ)
σj,P (θ)
.(69)
Let for some constant M > 0,
hn,P (ν)(β) = inf
γ∈ΓLRRP (β;κ)
p∑
j=1
[νj + qn,j,P ]
q
+(θ),(70)
hn,M,P (ν)(β) = inf
γ∈ΓLRRP (β;κ)
p∑
j=1
[νj + max{qn,j,P ,−M}]q+(θ),
and
h˜n,M,P (ν)(β) = inf
γ∈ΓLRRP (β;κ)
p∑
j=1
min{[νj + qn,j,P ]q+(θ),M q},(71)
h¯n,M,P (ν)(β) = inf
γ∈ΓLRRP (β;κ)
p∑
j=1
min{[νj + max{qn,j,P ,−M}]q+(θ),M q}.
Let us also define
h∆n,M,P (ν)(β) = |hn,P (ν)(β)− hn,M,P (ν)(β)|(72)
h¯∆n,M,P (ν)(β) = |hn,M,P (ν)(β)− h¯n,M,P (ν)(β)|, and
h˜∆n,M,P (ν)(β) = |h˜n,M,P (ν)(β)− h¯n,M,P (ν)(β)|.
Lemma 8.4. For any ν ∈ `∞(Θ), and n ≥ 1,
sup
β∈BP
|hn,P (ν)(β)− h¯n,M,P (ν)(β)| ≤ 3M q
p∑
j=1
Aj,M(ν),
where Aj,M(ν) = 1 {supθ∈Θ |νj(θ)| ≥M}.
Proof: Since we can bound
|hn,P (ν)(β)− h¯n,M,P (ν)(β)| ≤ h∆n,M,P (ν)(β) + h¯∆n,M,P (ν)(β),
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it suffices to show that
sup
β∈BP
h˜∆n,M,P (ν)(β) ≤ M q
p∑
j=1
Aj,M(ν),(73)
sup
β∈BP
h¯∆n,M,P (ν)(β) ≤ M q
p∑
j=1
Aj,M(ν), and
sup
β∈BP
|h∆n,M,P (ν)(β)− h˜∆n,M,P (ν)(β)| ≤ M q
p∑
j=1
Aj,M(ν).
For each j = 1, ..., p and θ ∈ ΘP , the absolute difference
|min{[νj + qn,j,P ]q+(θ),M q} −min{[νj + max{qn,j,P ,−M}]q+(θ),M q}|(74)
is zero if qn,j,P (θ) ≥ −M . Suppose that qn,j,P (θ) < −M . Then the difference is again zero if
νj(θ) ≤ M . Thus, we obtain the first statement in (73). As for the second statement, note
that for each j = 1, ..., p and θ ∈ ΘP , the difference
|[νj + max{qn,j,P ,−M}]q+(θ)−min{[νj + max{qn,j,P ,−M}]q+(θ),M q}|(75)
is not zero only if [νj + max{qn,j,P ,−M}]+(θ) ≥ M . Since max{qn,j,P (θ),−M} ≤ 0 for
each θ ∈ ΘP , the latter inequality implies that |νj(θ)| ≥ M . Thus we obtain the second
statement. As for the third statement in (73), the difference between
|[νj + qn,j,P ]q+(θ)− [νj + max{qn,j,P ,−M}]q+(θ)| and(76)
|min{[νj + qn,j,P ]q+(θ),M q} −min{[νj + max{qn,j,P ,−M}]q+(θ),M q}|,
is zero if qn,j,P (θ) > −M . Assume that qn,j,P (θ) ≤ −M . Then the last difference is not zero
only if [νj + qn,j,P ]+(θ) ≥M or
[νj + max{qn,j,P ,−M}]+(θ) ≥M.(77)
The union of the latter two events, under qn,j,P (θ) ≤ −M , is contained in the event [νj −
M ]+(θ) ≥M which implies that νj(θ) > M or that |νj(θ)| > M . 
Lemma 8.5. The following holds for each ε, η > 0, as n→∞ and M →∞.
(i)
sup
P∈P
sup
β∈BP
P
{|hn,P (ν˜n,P )(β)− h¯n,M,P (ν˜n,P )(β)| > ε}→ 0,
(ii)
sup
P∈P
sup
β∈BP
P
{
P
{|hn,P (ν˜∗n)(β)− h¯n,M,P (ν˜∗n)(β)| > ε|Gn} > η}→ 0.
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Proof: (i) By the first statement of Lemma 8.3, we find that
sup
P∈P
∣∣∣∣P {sup
θ∈Θ
|ν˜n,j,P (θ)| ≥M
}
− P
{
sup
θ∈Θ
|νj,P (θ)| ≥M
}∣∣∣∣→ 0.
By Lemma 8.4, it suffices to show that for any ε > 0 and any j = 1, ..., p,
sup
P∈P
M qP
{
sup
θ∈Θ
|νj,P (θ)| ≥M
}
→ 0.
However, the last probability is bounded by
M−1E
[
sup
θ∈Θ
|νj,P (θ)|q+1
]
≤ M−1 (d(q + 1)/2e!)q+1
∥∥∥∥sup
θ∈Θ
|νj,P (θ)|
∥∥∥∥q+1
ψ2
(78)
≤ Cq+1M−1,
for some C > 0, where ‖ · ‖ψ2 denotes the Orlicz norm with ψ2(x) = exp(x2)− 1, and dae,
a ∈ R, represents the smallest integer that is not smaller than a. The first inequality follows
because for any random variable X and p ≥ 1, ‖X‖2p ≤ p!‖X‖ψ2. The last inequality
follows from the proof of Corollary 2.2.8 of van der Vaart and Wellner (1996) and the
bracketing entropy bound which comes from Assumption 4.2 and the assumption that Θ
is compact. The last term in (78) vanishes as M →∞.
(ii) The second statement follows similarly by the second statement of Lemma 8.3. 
Lemma 8.6. For each c ∈ (0, pM q),
lim
ε→0
lim sup
n→∞
sup
P∈P
sup
β∈BLRRP (κ)
P{|h¯n,M,P (νP )(β)− c| ≤ ε} = 0.(79)
Proof: Let r˜j,P (θ) = max{qn,j,P (θ),−M}1{θ ∈ ΘP}, θ ∈ Θ. Then r˜j,P ∈ RM for each
j = 1, ..., p, and the desired result follows by Assumption 4.3. 
Lemma 8.7. For each M > 0 and η ∈ (0, pM q/2),
sup
P∈P
sup
β∈BLRRP (κ)
sup
c∈[η,pMq−η]
∣∣P{h¯n,M,P (ν˜n,P )(β) ≤ c} − P{h¯n,M,P (νP )(β) ≤ c}∣∣→ 0,(80)
and, for each ε > 0,
sup
P∈P
sup
β∈BLRRP (κ)
P
{
sup
c∈[η,pMq−η]
∣∣P {h¯n,M,Pn(ν˜∗n)(β) ≤ c|Gn}− P {h¯n,M,Pn(νP )(β) ≤ c}∣∣ > ε
}
→ 0,
as n→∞.
Proof: For each fixedM > 0, the functional h¯n,M,Pn is bounded Lipschitz with the Lipschitz
coefficient equal to pM q−1. By Lemmas 8.3, 8.6, and Lemma A.1 of Linton, Song, and
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Whang (2010), we have
sup
P∈P
sup
β∈BLRRP (κ)
∣∣P{h¯n,M,P (ν˜n,P )(β) ≤ c} − P{h¯n,M,P (νP )(β) ≤ c}∣∣→ 0(81)
for each c ∈ [η, pM q−η]. Due to Assumption 4.3, we can elevate this pointwise convergence
with uniformity over c ∈ [η, pM q − η] by using the same arguments in the proof of Lemma
2.11 of van der Vaart (1998), p.12. Using Lemmas 8.3 and 8.1, we can follow the same
arguments to obtain the second statement for the bootstrap empirical process. 
Recall the definition of T LRRP (β;κ) in (62) and let its CDF be denoted by Jn,P (·; β). Let
for each q ≥ 1,
Q˜P (β, γ) =
p∑
j=1
[
mj(θ)
σj,P (θ)
]q
+
,
which is different from Qˆ(β, γ) in that it involves σj,P in place of σˆj. Let
T˜ LRRP (β;κ) = n
q/2 inf
γ∈ΓLRRP (β;κ)
Q˜(β, γ) = hn,P (ν˜n,P )(β),(82)
recalling the definition of hn,P in (70). Let us denote the CDF of T˜ LRRP (β;κ) by J˜n,P (·; β)
and the conditional CDF of T LRR∗P (β;κ) given Gn by J
∗
n,P (·; β). (Recall the definition of
T LRR∗P (β;κ) in (64).) We also define
T˜ LRR∗P (β;κ) = hn,P (ν˜
∗
n)(β),(83)
and let its conditional CDF given Gn be denoted by J˜∗n(·; β). Let c˜LRR1−α,P (β;κ) be the 1 − α
percentile of the bootstrap distribution of T˜ LRR∗P (β;κ).
Lemma 8.8. Suppose that {Pn} ⊂ P be a given sequence and βn ∈ BLRRPn (κ), n ≥ 1. Then
lim inf
n→∞
Pn
{
T˜ LRRPn (βn;κ) ≥ c˜LRR1−α,Pn(βn;κ)
}
≥ 1− α,(84)
as n→∞.
Proof: By Theorem 2.4 (iii) and Lemmas S.5.1 and S.5.2 of the supplemental note of
Romano and Shaikh (2012) and Assumption 4.2, it suffices to show that for any ε > 0, and
for any sequence βn ∈ B,
Pn
{
sup
x∈R
∣∣∣J˜n,Pn(x; βn)− J˜∗n,Pn(x; βn)∣∣∣ > ε}→ 0,(85)
as n→∞. For the statement, it suffices to show that as n→∞,
sup
x∈R
∣∣∣J˜n,Pn(x; βn)− J˜∞n,Pn(x; βn)∣∣∣→ 0,(86)
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and for any ε > 0,
Pn
{
sup
x∈R
∣∣∣J˜∗n,Pn(x; βn)− J˜∞n,Pn(x; βn)∣∣∣ > ε}→ 0,(87)
where J˜∞n,Pn(x; β) denotes the CDF of hn,Pn(νPn)(β) and νPn is the Gaussian process in (40)
with P replaced by Pn. The statement (86) follows by Lemmas 8.4, 8.5 and 8.7. The
statement (87) follows by Lemmas 8.4, 8.5 and 8.7. Thus we obtain (84). 
Lemma 8.9. infP∈P P
{
CLRR1−α,P (κ) ⊂ CLRR1−α
}→ 1, as n→∞.
Proof: The desired result follows if
inf
P∈P
P
{
ΓˆLRR(β; 0) ⊂ ΓLRRP (β;κ) ⊂ ΓˆLRR(β; 2κ),∀β ∈ BLRRP (κ)
}
→ 1,
as n→∞. However, the latter convergence follows by Assumption 4.1. 
Lemma 8.10. (i) For any ε > 0, there exists Mε > 0 such that
lim sup
n→∞
sup
P∈P
sup
β∈B
P {hn,P (ν˜n,P )(β) ≥Mε} < ε.
(ii) For any ε > 0, there exists Mε > 0 such that
lim sup
n→∞
sup
P∈P
sup
β∈B
P {P {hn,P (ν˜n,P )(β) ≥Mε|Gn} > ε} = 0.
Proof: (i) Note that
hn,P (ν)(β) = inf
γ∈ΓLRRP (β;κ)
p∑
j=1
[νj + qn,j,P ]
q
+(θ) ≤ sup
θ∈ΘP
p∑
j=1
|νj(θ)|q ,(88)
because qn,j,P (θ) ≤ 0 for θ ∈ ΘP . By Lemma 8.3, hn,P (ν˜n,P )(β) is uniformly tight uniformly
over P ∈ P, and thus we have the desired result.
(ii) Note that
sup
P∈P
sup
β∈B
P {P {hn,P (ν˜n,P )(β) ≥Mε|Gn} > ε}
≤ sup
P∈P
sup
β∈B
P {P {|hn,P (ν˜n,P )(β) ≥Mε|Gn} − P {hn,P (νP )(β) ≥Mε} | > ε/2}
+ sup
P∈P
sup
β∈B
1 {P {hn,P (νP )(β) ≥Mε} > ε/2} .
The first supremum on the right hand side goes to zero as n→∞ by Lemma 8.3. By (88)
and the tightness of the Gaussian process, we can choose a large Mε such that the last term
becomes zero from some large n on. 
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Proof of Theorem 4.1: Recall the definitions of T˜ LRRP (β;κ) and T˜
LRR∗
P (β;κ) prior to Lemma
8.8. Define
hˆα1,n,P (ν)(β) = inf
γ∈ΓLRRP (β;κ)
p∑
j=1
[νj + min{νj + qn,j,P + κˆα1 , 0}]q+(θ),(89)
where qn,j,P is as defined in (69). By Assumption 4.1 (ii), and since qn,j,P (θ) ≤ 0 for all
θ ∈ ΘP ,
lim inf
n→∞
Pn
{
hˆα1,n,P (νˆ
∗
n)(βn) ≥ hn,P (νˆ∗n)(βn)
}
≥ 1− α1.(90)
Note that hˆα1,n,P (νˆ
∗
n)(βn) = T
LRR∗
P (βn;κ).
By definition, there exists a subsequence {nk} ⊂ {n} such that
lim inf
n→∞
inf
P∈P
inf
β∈BLRRP (κ)
P
{
β ∈ CLRR1−α,P (κ)
}
= lim
k→∞
Pnk
{
βnk ∈ CLRR1−α,Pnk (κ)
}
.(91)
Along the subsequence {nk}, we have from (8.2): for any ε > 0,
Pnk
{
max
1≤j≤p
sup
γ∈Γ
∣∣∣∣σj,Pnk (βnk , γ)σˆj(βnk , γ) − 1
∣∣∣∣ > ε}→ 0.
This implies that
Pnk
{∣∣∣hnk,P (νˆ∗nk)(βnk)− T˜ LRRPnk (βnk ;κ)∣∣∣ > ε}
= Pnk
{∣∣∣T˜ LRRPnk (βnk ;κ)∣∣∣ max1≤j≤p supγ∈Γ
∣∣∣∣σj,Pnk (βnk , γ)σˆj(βnk , γ) − 1
∣∣∣∣ > ε}→ 0,
as k → ∞, because T˜ LRRPnk (βnk ;κ) = hnk,P (ν˜nk,P )(β) is uniformly tight by Lemma 8.10.
Similarly for the bootstrap, we have
Pnk
{∣∣∣T LRR∗Pnk (βnk ;κ)− T˜ LRR∗Pnk (βnk ;κ)∣∣∣ > ε|Gnk}
= Pnk
{∣∣∣T˜ LRR∗Pnk (βnk ;κ)∣∣∣ max1≤j≤p supγ∈Γ
∣∣∣∣σj,Pnk (βnk , γ)σˆj(βnk , γ) − 1
∣∣∣∣ > ε|Gnk} = oP (1),
along {Pnk} as k → ∞ by Lemma 8.10. From Lemma 8.8, we find that the last limit in
(91) is bounded from below by 1− α. The desired result follows by Lemma 8.9. 
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